

Supplement to:

Makovi, Kinga, Ryan Hagen and Peter Bearman. 2016.
“The Course of Law: State Intervention in Southern
Lynch Mob Violence 1882–1930.” *Sociological Sci-*
ence 3: 860-888.

Table 1: The Determinants of Mob Formation – Alternative Specifications

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
% Black	0.0471 [†] (0.0065)	0.0503 [†] (0.0065)	0.0461 [†] (0.0065)
% Black squared	-0.0004 [†] (0.0001)	-0.0004 [†] (0.0001)	-0.0004 [†] (0.0001)
Cotton dependency	0.0130 [†] (0.0037)	0.0127 [†] (0.0037)	0.0130 [†] (0.0037)
Cotton price	-0.0030 [†] (0.0009)	-0.0039 [†] (0.0009)	-0.0028 [†] (0.0009)
Inflation	0.0263 [†] (0.0069)	0.0234 [†] (0.0066)	0.0251 [†] (0.0067)
Railroad density	0.2525 [†] (0.0629)	0.2192 [†] (0.0621)	0.2685 [†] (0.0627)
Railroad density squared	-0.0260* (0.0106)	-0.0229* (0.0104)	-0.0277 [†] (0.0106)
Opposition to the Democratic Party	-0.0067 [†] (0.0018)	-0.0035* (0.0018)	-0.0077 [†] (0.0018)
Disenfranchisement	-0.1128 [†] (0.0212)	-0.0816 (0.0740)	-0.0252 [†] (0.0036)
% Slaves in 1860	0.0090 (0.0088)	0.0028 (0.0089)	0.0141 (0.0088)
Average # of slaves/owner	-0.0078 (0.0096)	-0.0150 (0.0096)	-0.0029 (0.0096)
Constant	-3.2060 [†] (0.2276)	-3.3194 [†] (0.2288)	-3.2321 [†] (0.2267)
Log-likelihood	-8599.27	-8626.12	-8575.49

† $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Negative binomial model, units: 1880 county-years, se clustered on 1880 counties

In Table 1 we present three models which only differ in the way in which disenfranchisement was operationalized. Model (1) is the model presented in the main text. In model (2) we operationalized disenfranchisement as a 0–1, indicator variable, it takes 0 before disenfranchisement and 1 after it. Model (3) is similar to model (1), it uses a linear increase from the time of disenfranchisement to the end of the period. Nor model (2) or (3) take the correct functional form, at least theoretically, which is why we settled with the specification presented in the main text. It is important to note, however, that the point estimates of all of the other variables are remarkably stable. Furthermore, the direction of the coefficient on disenfranchisement is always negative, and in models (1) and (3) highly statistically significant. Finally, the fit statistic (log likelihood) on model (2) is below that of model (1) and (3).

Table 2: Goodness of Fit for Intervention Models ($p = 0.5$)

	All three states		Georgia		Mississippi		North Carolina	
	Classified Intervention							
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	24.7%	19.9%	9.1%	28.8%	58.5%	6.2%	0%	19.5%
Yes	13.5%	42.0%	7.4%	54.7%	28.0%	7.4%	0%	80.5%
Overall correct	66.7%		63.8%		65.8%		80.5%	

Table 3: Goodness of Fit for Intervention Success Models ($p = 0.5$)

	All three states		Georgia		Mississippi		North Carolina	
	Classified Intervention							
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	5.9%	14.7%	2.9%	13.9%	16.2%	18.2%	3.7%	13.2%
Yes	3.2%	76.1%	1.4%	81.8%	9.7%	55.8%	1.5%	81.6%
Overall correct	82.0%		84.7%		72.0%		85.3%	

Table 2 and Table 3 present the distribution of successfully and unsuccessfully classified cases in the logistic regression models for intervention, and intervention success, respectively, both aggregated, and broken down by state. For classification, simply $p = 0.5$ was used. For instance, 66% of all cases were correctly classified, either as received intervention, or not (42%, and 24%). The instances that were incorrectly classified distribute relatively evenly (19.9% were classified as intervention events, but in reality no intervention was mentioned in the historical record; and 13.5% of events received interventions, but were classified the opposite way). In Georgia, and North Carolina we predict relatively more interventions than their number, and in Mississippi we make the opposite mistake more often. A similar pattern describes the intervention success models in the state-by-state breakdown.